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THE CASE OF HIRAM JOHNSON

GUILTY

BY ALFRED HOLMAN

THE total Republican registration of California at the last Presidential election was 581,939.

The total Democratic registration was 233,840.

The total Progressive registration was 45,119.

Moreover, this registration was a new registration beginning on January 1, 1916. A large percentage of it was recorded after the Presidential nominations had been made. It is reasonable to assume that if party registration means anything at all, it means that the electors who under such circumstances have declared their party affiliations purpose to vote at least for the Presidential candidate of their party. California has been a strong Republican State. No Democratic Governor nor other Democratic State official has been elected for more than twenty years. California cast its electoral vote for President Roosevelt by one hundred and fifteen thousand plurality, for President Taft by ninety thousand plurality; and when in 1912 the names of the Taft electors did not appear on the ballot, with all the bitterness which this engendered, but two of its electoral votes went to President Wilson. California also had suffered in especial ways under the Wilson Administration. The tariff on citrus fruits had been revised to its serious injury; the life of the great beet-sugar industry was trembling in the balance; the fleet of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, and with it the American flag, had been driven off the Pacific ocean, and all American shippers had to submit to the preferences given by the Japanese lines to their own people. Moreover, California is a border State. Its citizens knew of the horrors of Mexico. They had lost heavily from their investments therein, and President Wilson's hopeless ineptitude in his

dealings with that country was as familiar as the expletives by which it was characterized.

Here, then, in the Democratic weakness, were elements of positive strength to any acceptable Republican candidate. And that Mr. Hughes *was* acceptable to California is not open to debate. In the Republican primary election held in April to elect delegates to the Republican National Convention an independent ticket won a decisive victory over the ticket openly advocated by Governor Johnson, which latter ticket was avowedly for Roosevelt and Johnson, and the delegation at Chicago voted for Mr. Hughes. So far as concerns the Progressives, Governor Johnson on returning to California declared that he intended to vote for Mr. Hughes. The grievance which he expressed was not over the fact that Mr. Hughes was nominated, but only that Colonel Roosevelt did not let the leading Progressives know that he would accept Mr. Hughes—so that the Progressive convention might have nominated him first, and thus have put the Republican party in the position of being compelled to accept the Progressive candidate. Chester H. Rowell, a Progressive National Committeeman and an ardent supporter of Governor Johnson, sought and obtained place as a member of Mr. Hughes' National Republican Campaign Committee.

Thus, on the face of the record was the assurance of a Hughes victory so positive, so overwhelming, that no one outside of the State ever thought of putting California in the doubtful column. Nor indeed did any one within the State, until so late that when suspicion grew into conviction, it was impossible to retrieve the situation.

What was the result of the election?

Hughes (Republican) for President...	462,516
Wilson (Democrat) for President....	466,289
Johnson (Republican and Progressive) for United States Senate.....	574,667
Patton (Democrat) for United States Senate	277,852

The impossible had happened; and for it there were but two possible explanations. Either Mr. Hughes had in some amazing and unsuspected way sacrificed himself; or he had been sacrificed. Where lies the reality?

The truth of history calls for a plain setting-forth of the conditions and circumstances contributing to this result

which has given the Presidency during the coming four years to the Democracy, with effects likely to be reflected for many years to come in the political life of the nation. Under what influences and motives did California thus abandon established affiliations and so bestow its electoral vote as to support not its traditional sympathies but its traditional antipathies? How and why did Hiram Johnson, official nominee of the Republican party for the Senatorship—and California's political dictator—carry the State by more than 300,000 votes, while Charles E. Hughes, head of the ticket upon which Mr. Johnson was a candidate, was beaten by nearly 4,000? There is a discrepancy here which on its face presents an indictment of double-dealing and broken faith. *Res ipsa loquitur*. The purpose of this writing is to examine and appraise the facts of the case—to explain how and why it all came about.

It hardly needs to be said that in estimating the forces which enter into a general election many things must be taken into account. The outstanding fact in the immediate case is the political power of Governor (and Senator-elect) Johnson. The history leading up to Mr. Johnson's political ascendancy, the conditions and the means under which and by which he became the power that he is in the politics of California, make the basis of a tempting study. The story, regarded as a sidelight upon certain tendencies in popular government or as a dramatic episode in American political history, is well worth the telling. But it is sufficient for the present purpose to relate only such matters as have a material bearing on our subject of inquiry.

Governor Johnson is serving his second term. He was first elected in 1910 as a Republican. Every legislature has been the creature of his will. In 1912 he took to the Republican Convention at Chicago a delegation favoring Colonel Roosevelt for President. With his following he joined the revolting Republicans and became the nominee for Vice-President of the Progressive party. He thus became an active leader and seeker for office in a new national party of pronounced hostility to the Republican party, which, in deserting, the Progressives had anathematized. On returning to California Governor Johnson called a conference of his Progressive followers. By election laws of his devising the nominees winning at the primary election go into convention, dictate the party platform, the membership of the State

Central Committee, and in Presidential years select the men whose names go on the November ballot as Presidential electors. In 1912, the Republican Convention which would do these things would be composed of the Republican nominees to the State Legislature. These nominees it was certain would be controlled by the Governor. Therefore, the Progressive conference decided to call upon all Progressives to run for Senate or Assembly *not* as Progressives, but as Republicans; and, being successful, then as Republican nominees to go into convention and select as Republican Presidential electors men who should be committed to vote, *not* for the Republican Presidential candidates, Taft and Sherman, but for the Progressive candidates, Roosevelt and *Johnson*. This was the programme, and it was successfully carried out. Amazing as it may seem, Governor Johnson was easily able to secure Progressive legislative candidates who, registered as Republicans and seeking office as Republicans, were pledged to carry out the plot to destroy the party they were in honor bound to protect.

Enough of these men secured nominations to accomplish the desired end. They met in a so-called Republican convention; they put in charge of the Republican party organization for the four years to follow nobody but approved Progressives. They named as Republican Presidential electors Progressives, pledged to cast their votes in the Electoral College for Roosevelt and *Johnson*.

What, then, was the plight of the *bona fide* Republicans of the State, of the true Republican party, which, owing allegiance to the National Republican organization, sought to support the one and only Republican nominee for the Presidency, Mr. Taft? It was helpless. For relief, for redress, for the correction of this grave wrong, it could turn nowhere, could do nothing. To every effort made came the one inevitable reply, "So the law is written. The Republican Convention formed in accordance with law has named Republican electors. There cannot be two sets of such Republican electors. It is not a matter for the courts, it is not a justiciable question, whether those Republican electors if sent to the Electoral College will or will not vote for the nominees of the party they represent. That is a matter of personal honor and not of legal right."

By these machinations the result was accomplished that in the Presidential election of November, 1912, no names of

electors for President Taft were printed on the ballot; and while the names of Republican electors appeared on the ballot, each and every one of them was pledged to vote for Roosevelt and *Johnson*, and all of them (saving two lost to President Wilson) did so. Governor Johnson was not only the direct beneficiary of this intrigue, but actually stood sponsor for it. He issued a proclamation too long to be repeated in full. But here is the opening paragraph, his justification; and even the casual reader will note that what it lacks in ethical perception, is compensated for by its self-laudatory arrogance, not wholly concealed by the modest omission to state that this electoral vote is not only to be cast for Theodore Roosevelt for President, but also and equally for himself for Vice-President:

At a conference yesterday it was determined that every legitimate effort should be made to cast the electoral vote of California for Theodore Roosevelt for President. Neither morally or equitably is Mr. Taft the nominee of the Republican party. Morally and equitably Theodore Roosevelt is. The Republican party of California is progressive and in this State the party was redeemed and made respectable by Progressives. California's Republican party resents the taint and the fraud of the Chicago National Convention and will not tolerate the alliance there demonstrated between crooked politics and crooked business. . . . It has therefore been determined that those candidates for the legislature in the Republican party who are progressive shall agree, if they are successful, to nominate candidates for Presidential electors who will vote for Roosevelt for President.

In the next event to be recorded Mr. Chester H. Rowell occupies the center of the stage. The Progressives continued to hold control of the Republican party thus obtained. They believed that they had destroyed that party in the State. The only question with them was whether it was worth while to hold that control for their own ends. In 1914, Governor Johnson was again a candidate for Governor, this time the Progressive candidate. Mr. Francis J. Heney was contesting with Mr. Rowell for the Progressive nomination for the United States Senate. Mr. Rowell wrote to a friend who wanted to know what the Progressive programme was to be and whether it embraced a continued holding of the control of the Republican party organization. Excerpts from the letter here follow:

We are in possession of the (Republican) party and if nothing

but California were involved we would have as good a right to the name "Republican" as to the name "Progressive"; if we thought it worth while to keep it. . . . This is not a matter for any one man to settle, though in the final resort I suppose the Governor will have to be the arbiter, since he is the only one to whose judgment other people will cheerfully yield. . . . It may be entirely possible for local organizations . . . while maintaining the Progressive party intact to grab the Republican party also, whenever that seems to be worth while. . . . To me the procedure seems to be impracticable, illogical and inconsistent, and obviously it cannot be continued indefinitely. If, however, it should seem to be the practical method of meeting some local conditions and is the desire of the local people, I have no squeamishness about it provided the law permits.

Two things in these quotations are to be noted: the acknowledged dictatorship of Governor Johnson; and the lack of "squeamishness" upon the part of Mr. Rowell in continuing the rape of the Republican party with personal advantage to himself, provided he did not run foul of the law in so doing. This last was but a fear born of imagination since Mr. Rowell was well advised that a law of his party's own contriving did permit this very thing and had been successfully used to disfranchise the Republicans of California in the Taft-Wilson election.

The Progressives finally decided that they had killed the Republican party and so could leave it to be buried by public charity. Indeed they declared this in effect and almost in words, and after kicking the corpse turned it over to whoever cared to undertake its interment or its resurrection. In the primary Mr. Rowell was defeated by Mr. Heney for the Progressive nomination for United States Senate. In the State election which followed Governor Johnson was again triumphantly elected the Progressive Governor, but Mr. Heney was defeated for the United States Senate by Mr. Phelan, a Democrat, whose name had scarcely been mentioned in the campaign. The local shock of this election was second only to that of the present one. Mr. Heney publicly and bitterly charged Gov. Johnson with treachery to him—with treachery within his own Progressive party to a candidate who had honorably in open contest won its nomination against his favorite, Mr. Rowell. He charged that he was the victim of an understanding between Governor Johnson and Mr. Phelan, whereby Progressive support was given to

the latter in return for Democratic money and support for the former. Be that as it may, we have already learned from Mr. Rowell's ready pen the autocratic control which Governor Johnson exercised over his followers, and it is certain that Mr. Phelan could not have been elected without Progressive support.

Next to be noted is the defeat of Governor Johnson's effort to elect (for the California law requires an election of delegates to National Conventions) a delegation to the last Chicago Convention favorable to Colonel Roosevelt and *Governor Johnson*. This was strictly a Republican party primary, since the Progressives at that time were registered as Progressives and could not participate. Governor Johnson was himself a registered Progressive. His Republican ticket was defeated and an independent ticket was chosen.

There is now to be chronicled the home-coming of Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell after the Chicago Conventions of 1916. Mr. Rowell had remained long enough in the East to secure a solicited membership on Mr. Hughes' campaign committee. No Republican in California knew of this before it was a fact accomplished and it came to them as a distinct shock, because they did know Mr. Rowell's self-declared lack of squeamishness and his hostility to the Republican party, and did know that his first and last political allegiance was to Governor Johnson, and knowing these things they feared for the cause they had at heart. This fear at the time was editorially expressed by Republican papers.

Governor Johnson signaled his return to California by calling a "conference" of the Progressive party. He addressed it. He announced that the Progressive party was nationally dead. He advised his followers to register in the old parties and endeavor to Progressivize them. He declared that as the situation then stood between Mr. Hughes and Mr. Wilson, he individually was going to vote for Mr. Hughes. He did not ask his people to follow his example and to give Mr. Hughes their support. He then launched his candidacy for the United States Senate.

Under State laws, put by the Progressives on the books, it is possible for a Progressive by the signatures of a handful of complacent men calling themselves Republicans or Democrats to become a candidate for the Republican or Democratic nomination for any office. His name is then voted on at a primary election and a plurality vote makes that Progressive

the Republican or Democratic nominee for the given office. Governor Johnson announced his intention thus to secure the Republican nomination. There was, of course, no opposition to him in his own Progressive party, so he and his aids called upon the Progressives to abandon their Progressive registration and re-register as Republicans. The design was first to secure for himself the Republican nomination for the Senate, and second once more to secure control of the Republican organization, as he had done in the Taft election. These purposes were openly declared, the method openly advocated. It should be remembered that the Progressives were not told to register as Republicans because they were Republicans, but as Progressives to register as Republicans to accomplish these ends. Daily Mr. Rowell in his Fresno newspaper advocated this, pointing out that "the law permits it"—a law put upon the books by Governor Johnson and himself, and characterized by publicists as unique in its corrupt design. It would appear that some dim perception of this penetrated Mr. Rowell's understanding, for he usually followed these appeals and demands with a conclusion like the following quoted from one of his editorials: "We are not urging any Progressive to do this, but are merely pointing out the practical advantage for such as are willing to change." It illustrates the absolute dominance exercised by Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell over their followers when it is stated that in response to this call the Progressive registration—the registration of the dominant party in California—sank to nothingness. In precincts where the new registration had shown a hundred Progressives within thirty days there was not one. Thus padded, the Republican registration was enormously increased by the names of thousands of electors who thus showed their obedience to Governor Johnson's commands.

The real Republicans of California, those who had sent the Hughes delegation to the Chicago Convention, looked with alarm on this second open attempt to seize their party nominations and organization. Neither Governor Johnson nor Mr. Rowell was a Republican. Both were avowed and registered Progressives. The national Senatorial situation was close and critical, and it was the duty of the Republicans of California to send to the Senate if possible a Republican. Principle and prudence united in the demand that the Republican candidate should be definitely a Republican, pledged to

party doctrines and dependable in the Senate as a supporter of the Republican administration. Therefore the Republicans opposed Governor Johnson's attempt to capture their Senatorial nomination and the organization of their party. The last because Progressive success would put in Progressive hands the absolute control of the Hughes campaign, and they had witnessed what that meant four years before.

William H. Crocker, Republican National Committeeman from California, advocated the election of the one Republican candidate in the field, Willis H. Booth. For this he was arraigned by Mr. Rowell in the following telegram:

San Francisco, July 14, 1916.

To W. H. CROCKER, etc.: Chairman Willcox has wired me and I understand also to you asking us to consult regarding Senatorial situation. It is given out here that you have instead gone to Los Angeles to consult only an anti-Johnson half of that situation, with a view by elimination to concentrate opposition to Johnson. If this is true I wish as your colleague on Hughes National Campaign Committee to protest most vigorously. If State committee wishes to narrow itself to factional organization that's its business, but national organization must not be put into this position, especially it should not be done by action of one national representative against protest of other and contrary to policy of Eastern leaders. Position of national leaders, as I know first hand, is definitely favorable to Johnson. I insist either that there be no elimination, or that if eliminating is to be done, proposition to eliminate in favor of as well as against Johnson be considered. Will be at Palace Hotel till Sunday.

(Signed) CHESTER H. ROWELL.

This telegram sheds further light on Mr. Rowell's mental processes. He holds that Mr. Crocker, a Republican, merits criticism for endeavoring to help a Republican secure the Republican nomination for the United States Senate, while manifestly considering his own conduct impeccable, when as a member of Mr. Hughes' Republican National Campaign Committee he was devoting his utmost efforts to aid a man *not* a Republican to secure that nomination. But it does more than that. It contains a statement which had an important bearing on future events. That statement is "Position of national leaders, as I know first hand, is definitely favorable to Johnson." This statement meant and could only mean Eastern *Republican* leaders. It was so accepted, for no one doubted that the Eastern Progressive leaders favored Governor Johnson, as did Mr. Rowell himself. Mr.

Rowell was publicly challenged to name the Eastern Republican leaders who, at first hand, he knew favored Governor Johnson's candidacy. He failed to reply and never has replied. His silence was damaging. It fell just short of convicting him of tergiversation—to use no shorter, uglier word. But Mr. Rowell's criticism was not all nor half of what Mr. Crocker's commendable conduct brought down on him; for the Governor's wrath was aroused and was characteristically displayed by the vilification he unceasingly poured out on Mr. Crocker.

The Progressives at the time of this telegram were not sailing summer seas. They were seriously alarmed lest Governor Johnson might not win the Republican nomination. Should he fail, there was a likelihood, with the Progressive nomination alone, that he would suffer defeat in what was believed to be a strong Republican year. Governor Johnson, for California audiences at least, a skilled and capable campaigner, was using in his addresses, as evidencing Mr. Hughes' support, a telegram sent him by the latter before the Governor had announced his candidacy for the United States Senate. In this telegram Mr. Hughes thanked the Governor for his promise to vote for him and expressed pleasure that their political ideals were not dissimilar. It would be a valuable aid to Governor Johnson's campaign if Mr. Hughes could be brought to California before the primary election and exploited for the good of the Governor's cause. The Governor, by virtue of his executive position, would receive and personally conduct him through the State; the statement in the Rowell telegram would be justified; the people would see that Mr. Hughes favored Governor Johnson's candidacy, and all would be well with the world.

To the accomplishment of this Mr. Rowell bent his energies. Mr. Hughes long before had been invited to include California in his campaign tour, and Mr. Crocker and other Republicans had joined in the invitation. With the complications which had arisen over the Governor's after-announced Senatorial aspirations it was manifestly inexpedient that Mr. Hughes should visit California *before* the Senatorial primary. If he did so there was danger of the estrangement of the Progressives if it was charged that he "played up" too close to the Republicans, and on the other hand there was danger of antagonizing the Republicans if it was thought that he was unduly ignoring the members of

the party whose nomination he had accepted. The simple solution of the difficulty was to have Mr. Hughes postpone his visit until *after* the Senatorial primary, when he could tour the State with the successful candidate, Johnson or Booth, without the possibility of giving offense. This is no afterthought. It was thoroughly appreciated at the time by Mr. Hughes' wellwishers, and many telegrams to this effect went on to the chairman of the Republican National Campaign Committee, Mr. Willcox. It is said that the influence of these telegrams was entirely overcome by the force of Mr. Rowell's official position and opposing representations. On this I do not pretend to speak with knowledge, but the fact is certain that the only responses were answers from Mr. Willcox that Mr. Hughes' itinerary had been arranged and would not be changed.

Such were the local conditions when Mr. Hughes came to California ten days before the Senatorial primary. Mr. Crocker and Mr. Rowell had been asked by Chairman Willcox to meet him in Portland. Mr. Rowell went. Mr. Crocker declined to go. Mr. Rowell, the accredited spokesman of the Progressives, thus had Mr. Hughes' undivided attention for twenty-four hours before his arrival in California. It is inconceivable to one who knows Mr. Rowell that the California situation from the Progressive point of view should not have been adequately, indeed exhaustively presented. Mr. Crocker's declination to go to Portland sprang from his declared attitude, "I will not," he said, "say one word to the candidate about local differences unless he shall invite explanations." Mr. Hughes never asked for light on the matter during his visit, and such knowledge as he possessed therefore came from Mr. Rowell.

Mr. Hughes was met at the State line by a delegation composed in about equal proportions of Republicans and Progressives and Mr. Crocker and Mr. Rowell were both present. At his meeting in San Francisco Mr. Crocker presided, Mr. Rowell occupying a conspicuous position on the speaker's platform. His California addresses discussed national problems and party issues, and contained this and this only touching State matters, "I come to California as the spokesman of the National Republican party. With local differences I have no concern."

So Mr. Hughes came, spoke and went his way—but without meeting Governor Johnson. The Governor had refused

invitations to join in greeting Mr. Hughes at the State line and to be present at his meetings, notwithstanding the fact that his declaration that he would support him was never withdrawn. The conduct and utterances of Mr. Hughes as a candidate for the highest office in the nation, were from the standpoint of the gentleman, flawless; from the standpoint of the politician it is argued that he should have sought out Governor Johnson and curried favor with him. Whether a candidate for the Presidency should seek out a Governor of notorious vindictiveness, who has refused to meet him, to the end that he may solicit and obtain that Governor's political support, is a question that may be left to the *quid nuncs*. Whether if it had been done in this instance the candidate would have received that support on any tolerable terms, is a question which I have no hesitation in answering in the negative. For consider the situation:

Mr. Hughes had given no offense to Governor Johnson *before* he entered California, and yet the Governor refused to meet and greet him. Here was the first affront, and that was an affront put upon, not inflicted by, Mr. Hughes. Governor Johnson, though in the neighborhood, refused to attend Mr. Hughes' Los Angeles meeting. Governor Johnson knew of Mr. Hughes' presence at a hotel where the Governor was staying—Mr. Hughes did not know of Governor Johnson's presence. Governor Johnson neither called on Mr. Hughes nor made his presence known. The only explanation is that Mr. Rowell must have communicated to the Governor after his Portland interview with Mr. Hughes some message which fixed his antagonism. For of that antagonism there can be no doubt. The press commented on it at the time; and thereafter the answer which Governor Johnson sent to Mr. Hughes' telegram of congratulation when he had succeeded in securing the Republican nomination at the August primary, was in manner and matter designedly sneering and contemptuous and was so characterized by the newspapers.

Governor Johnson did, by thus padding the Republican registry with Progressives, win the Republican nomination for the Senate, and the control of the organization of the Republican party of California for the next four years. After the primary Mr. Crocker, ignoring the Governor's scurrile treatment of him, publicly declared that: "Past political differences in California must be forgotten. We must unite to elect the candidates of our party. Vote the ticket from top

to bottom." Governor Johnson's response to this was to refuse to permit Mr. Crocker to be named as a Presidential elector. Indeed he refused recognition on the Republican State Central Committee, which he named, to any true Republican. All were Progressives headed by Chester H. Rowell, chairman.

It was late in August when the management of Mr. Hughes' affairs in California was turned over under the law to this new Republican State Central Committee composed of Progressives named by Governor Johnson, and then and there died the Hughes campaign in California. During the two last important active months preceding a Presidential election a visitor to California would not have known that Mr. Hughes was a candidate. Governor Johnson, who says very truly that his election was assured when the result of the August primary was known, vehemently denies responsibility for Mr. Hughes' defeat, and protests that his State-wide campaign made after the August primaries was conceived and executed on behalf of Mr. Hughes. But he fails to explain many things. He fails, for example, to explain why, his election being assured, enormous sums of money should have been spent on his campaign; why the bill-boards should have been plastered with his picture as with circus-posters; why his posters should have called upon the people to elect him as the "man who does things" and should have contained no reference to the Republican party whose nomination he had sought and secured, nor to Mr. Hughes, the head of that party; why he never called on his organization to support Mr. Hughes; why he never called on his followers to support Mr. Hughes; why if he was touring the State for Mr. Hughes he did not do these things; why when he spoke in a town he did not speak for Mr. Hughes, and why shortly thereafter disturbing news would begin to come in that that town was "not so strong for Hughes as had been thought"; why in Los Angeles, but a few days before election, he carried words of cheer to the Democrats in a public interview published in the *Los Angeles Express*, in which he declared it "extremely doubtful" if Mr. Hughes would carry California and did not even then call upon his faithful to rally to the support of his candidate. For there is one thing which nobody in California questions for an instant. If Governor Johnson had desired the success of Mr. Hughes, one word to his organization of seven thousand office holders would

have been a guarantee of Mr. Hughes' election. That word was never spoken. True it is that in the last few days of the campaign he said more on the platform for Mr. Hughes than previously he had said in all the campaign. But by that time he had, after his complete tour of the State, succeeded in whispering Mr. Hughes' chances to death, and this belated advocacy was laughed at by his followers and characterized as designed "to save his face," and as a punishment to Senator Phelan for having broken the "gentleman's agreement" between them, under which Senator Phelan was to let the Senatorial situation alone and Governor Johnson was to do likewise as to the Presidency—the earlier understanding between them charged by Mr. Heney to which I have adverted, coupled with the fact that Governor Johnson's first espousal of Mr. Hughes came immediately after Senator Phelan had spoken in advocacy of Mr. Patton, lending some color to the characterization.

In all this two facts stand admitted: one, that the real Republicans of California ardently supported Mr. Hughes. Mr. Crocker, for example, turning over twenty-five thousand dollars to the Johnson Republican State Central Committee; the other, that the Progressives registered as Republicans and conducting the Republican campaign did not support Mr. Hughes. The grievance of the Republican party in the State and nation is not that Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell did not support Mr. Hughes. They had the unquestioned right to support President Wilson and to call on their followers to do so; but they had no right to seize the control of the Republican party machinery by false registration, as they did, and then to use that control to encompass Mr. Hughes' overthrow. Mr. Rowell, as chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, had no right to still Republican fears by assurances, made up to the last moment and until it was too late to retrieve the designed disaster, that Mr. Hughes was sure to carry the State by 50,000.

It was the deliberate treachery of Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell which lost Mr. Hughes the electoral vote of California. These are harsh words, but if their complete justification is not established by the facts set forth, add to their consideration the following: It was in the three cities and counties where Johnson's and Rowell's strength was greatest that Mr. Hughes received his deepest wounds: In San Francisco, where Governor Johnson lives and dominates the

city administration; in Sacramento, the capital and seat of the Johnson machine; in Fresno, where Mr. Rowell and his paper have their homes. The Republican registration in San Francisco was 105,467, the Democratic registration 38,161; yet Mr. Hughes lost San Francisco by 15,000 and Mr. Johnson carried it by 72,000. The Republican registration in Sacramento was 20,128, the Democratic registration 7,592; yet Mr. Hughes lost Sacramento County by 4,000 and Mr. Johnson carried it by 8,000. The Republican registration in Fresno was 14,813, the Democratic registration 11,369; yet Mr. Hughes lost Fresno County by nearly 3,000 and Mr. Johnson carried it by 6,000. Again, in the upbuilding of his political machine, Governor Johnson has not forgotten the press, and the campaign attitude of his subsidized papers merits notice. The proprietor of the *Sacramento Bee* holds a Johnson appointment on the State Board of Reclamation; emoluments, twenty dollars per day while attending to the business of the board and "necessary expenses." The *Bee* supported President Wilson and Governor Johnson with equal ardor. The proprietor of the *Stockton Record* is a Johnson appointee on the State Water Commission, salary five thousand dollars per annum. Like the *Sacramento Bee*, that paper supported President Wilson and Governor Johnson with unbounded enthusiasm, in recognition of which the proprietor received the following letter of commendation on November 15th, after the result of the election was certain:

MY DEAR MR. MARTIN: To you and to the *Stockton Record* I want to express not only my appreciation, but my deep sense of obligation for your constant, consistent and able advocacy of that for which I stand. . . . The loyalty of papers like yours . . . and of men like you . . . contributing so much to the result, have my heartfelt thanks.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) HIRAM JOHNSON.

In this naïve statement we have the confession from the Governor's own pen. Mr. Martin "ably advocated" those things for which Governor Johnson stood. Mr. Martin "ably advocated" the re-election of President Wilson. What more is needed?

Once before, as I have been at pains to set forth, Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell, in a slightly different way, betrayed the Republican party. The only reason the country

did not then ring with it was because, while locally successful, nationally they failed. Colonel Roosevelt and Governor Johnson were defeated. This time Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell have succeeded nationally, and they are entitled to all the odium or praise which that success merits.

Still further confirmation of this conclusion is found in the shifty and shifting explanations which these men continue to put forth. Governor Johnson's defense that he toured California on behalf of Mr. Hughes has been adverted to. At first he was inclined to admit that the Progressives had been estranged because he had been slighted. He even included Mr. Rolph, the Mayor of San Francisco, in the arraignment, and charged Mr. Hughes with having also "slighted the greatest vote-getter of San Francisco." All San Francisco smiled at the suggestion that Mr. Rolph would have supported Mr. Hughes, or anybody else, in the face of organized labor's pronouncement for President Wilson. Also the Governor's first explanation embraced the admission that his personal grievance made known to his people had worked Mr. Hughes' defeat. This, on reflection, manifestly would not do. It was a tacit admission of treason coupled with a showing of autocracy over a blind following, and so Mr. Rowell stepped manfully forward and proclaimed that the slight put on the Governor was a negligible factor in Mr. Hughes' defeat. The real cause was the haughty arrogance of the "Old Guard" Republicans of California who were successful in creating the impression that Mr. Hughes was one of them. Mr. Rowell in this explanation graciously acquitted Mr. Hughes of intent to offend, excusing his conduct on the ground that he was ignorant of local conditions. But this explanation took no account of the fact that Mr. Rowell alone, and no member of the Old Guard, held uninterrupted converse with Mr. Hughes in Portland, so that all Mr. Hughes knew of local conditions came from the Progressives. Also this explanation failed to explain that the haughty arrogance of the Old Guard was put out of existence two months before the election, when the Progressives took full charge of the Hughes campaign; and finally it did not explain why Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell did not disabuse their followers' minds of this utterly mistaken notion concerning Mr. Hughes' attitude. So this had to be abandoned. After these and many other shiftings Governor Johnson, with Mr. Rowell in accord, now tell the

nation that in his California campaign Mr. Hughes "failed to convince" the Progressives that he carried their principles in his heart of hearts. As though the Progressives of California, who once before seized control of the Republican party to destroy its candidate, President Taft; who just now, while Progressives, colonized the Republican party in the successful effort once more to take over its management, and did both of these things on the mere demand of Governor Johnson, needed any more convincing in this campaign than the word of their master!

Significant also is the fact that from neither Governor Johnson nor Mr. Rowell has come the slightest expression of the regret which a loyal follower feels over a leader's downfall; no word of repining even over the destinies of the nation committed for four more long years to President Wilson's hands. On the contrary, Mr. Rowell's joy over the result was ill-concealed, and it was with real jubilation that he pointed out that political lines had shifted; that the West and South had elected a President without the great Eastern and Middle Western States; that the Republican party of California was now thoroughly Progressive; that immediate effort would be made to Progressivize the national Republican party; that failing in this it was still to be remembered that Wilson was elected because he was believed to be more progressive than was Mr. Hughes; that what had been done this time could be done again; and that it was not to be forgotten that Governor Johnson was the great leader of the Western Progressives. Reflect on this for one moment! Mr. Hughes' election would certainly have meant his renomination four years hence, and Governor Johnson's hopes would suffer a necessary deferment of eight years—enough to make any aspirant's heart sick. President Wilson could look to no third term. In four years Democracy would be seeking a candidate. Who better fitted for it than this Lochinvar out of the West, who had given President Wilson his second term, and who could accept the Democratic nomination without sacrifice of principle, since, if the Republicans did not nominate him, it would be because they were not Progressive, while the Democrats were, and he above all else was, wedded to Progressivism. It will be interesting to watch Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell's efforts to mould the Republican party a little nearer to their heart's desire by their familiar and practiced methods.

ALFRED HOLMAN.